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THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1984:
HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF THEORY AND PRACTICE. By Edward S. Corwin.2 Fifth Revised Edition by
Randall W. Bland,3 Theodore T. Hindson,4 and Jack W.
Peltason.s New York: New York University Press. 1984.
Pp. xxii, 565. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $20.00.

CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT. By Louis Fisher.6
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1984. Pp. xviii,
372. Cloth, $40.00; paper, $8.95.
Charles A. Lofgren7

Edward S. Corwin, the leading American constitutional commentator of the first half of the twentieth century, bequeathed a rich
legacy. He authored or co-authored twenty books, over sixty articles in professional journals in history, law, and political science,
150 book reviews, and a large miscellany of short notes, articles in
popular and "high brow" publications, and other items.s During
I. Member, California Bar, and doctoral student at the University of California, Los
Angeles.
2. Late McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence, Princeton University.
3. Professor of Political Science, Southwest Texas State University, San Marcos.
4. Professor of Political Science, Southwest Texas State University, San Marcos.
5. President American Council on Education; Chancellor, University of California,
Irvine.
6. Specialist in American National Government with the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress.
7. Roy P. Crocker Professor of American Politics and History, Claremont McKenna
College.
8. I base these figures on the listings in K. CREWS, EDWARDS. CORWIN AND THE
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his career, he was a frequent subject of news reports and a soughtafter source of instant constitutional analysis; and since his death in
1963 his scholarship has continued to be consulted. Who of us does
not turn to the Library of Congress's annotated Constitution of the
United States, still based significantly on Corwin's 1953 edition?9
Who has not had occasion to use The President, Office and Powers
and marvel at its richness? His writings, moreover, have been the
subject of several critical studies.
Constitutional scholars are indebted to Kenneth D. Crews and
Greenwood Press for bringing out what is likely to remain the definitive Corwin bibliography (even though Crews himself notes that a
few other items are likely to surface). The compilation also identifies writings about Corwin, both during his career and since his
death. Not least, Crews has provided a short (48-page) biographical
introduction, drawn partly from oral interviews and the Corwin
archive at Princeton, that makes fascinating reading for anyone in
the academic business. Its contents range from tidbits to serious
insights into the scholar-teacher.
We learn, for example, that Corwin's afterhours bull sessions
with law students, while he was a freshman in college, helped fire
his lifelong interest in constitutional law. By 1900, when he gained
his bachelor's degree from the University of Michigan, his undergraduate mentor, Andrew C. McLaughlin, himself one of the early
"greats" in the constitutional field, concluded, "I cannot teach this
young man anything; he already knows all about the subject." In
1905, fresh with a Ph.D. in American history from the University of
Pennsylvania, Corwin was one of the initial group of preceptors that
Woodrow Wilson brought to Princeton University, as part of his
effort at curricular reform. Almost from the beginning, however,
Corwin had significant differences with the future President. This
divergence carried into Wilson's presidential years, when Corwin,
by then a full professor at Princeton, proffered the advice that Wilson should invoke national supremacy through concluding a treaty
with Japan in order to resolve tensions created by California's mistreatment of Japanese immigrants. In a personal letter to his protege, Wilson pointedly refused, asserting, "I do not feel by any
means as confident as you do as to the power of the Federal GovAMERICAN CONSTITUTION: A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ANALYSIS (1985) [hereinafter cited as
CREWS], and have omitted short notes from the count of scholarly articles and books compiled after Corwin's death from the book count. For slightly different figures, see E.
CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1984, at xi (R. Bland, T. Hindson, &
J. Peltason 5th ed. 1984) (revisers' introduction) [hereinafter cited as CORWIN (5th ed.)].
9. See LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION (1973).

1986]

BOOK REVIEW

195

ernment in the matter of overriding the constitutional powers of the
states through the instrumentality of treaties . . . ." Notwithstanding such differences, Corwin was probably disappointed at not
receiving a position in the Wilson administration. to
From the same era, Corwin's attraction to Teddy Roosevelt's
New Nationalism foreshadowed his welcoming of Franklin D.
Roosevelt's New Deal, which he proclaimed the test of "the capacity of the Constitution to absorb a revolution." The New Deal also
gave his scholarly expertise greater practical outlet, including a stint
with the Housing Office of the Public Works Administration and a
consulting (if partly unwitting) role in shaping the Court-packing
plan.
By the post-World War II period, however, Corwin questioned
the growth of presidential power and the waning of state authority.
But his opinions did not fit into any of the conventional ideological
grooves, as he proved when he co-chaired the committee that directed the successful effort to block the Bricker Amendment. By
restricting treaties and executive agreements, the proposal would
arguably have assuaged some of Corwin's latter-day concerns, yet
he held fast to earlier commitments in this area. Also, though
neither an avid fan of civil rights nor an advanced civil libertarian,
in 1951-52 he joined an unpopular local effort to protect the rights
of the "Trenton Six," a group of New Jersey blacks charged with
murder. Finally, because the confusion did not end with his death,
it bears underscoring that Corwin's first name was not "Edwin," an
appellation that bedeviled him throughout his life. (It rhymed with
Corwin.)tt
All told, perhaps the most intriguing episode was the boomlet
to place the Princeton professor on the Supreme Court. Corwin
had given the New Deal public scholarly support, both by arguing
for the constitutional adequacy of the new agencies and by questioning the Court's freeswinging role. By the mid-1930's, moreover,
he had emerged as one of the nation's most quoted constitutional
authorities; hence, as FDR's troubles with the Court grew, public
speculation centered on an appointment for the academician. Not
least, Corwin himself was well aware of the prospect. "He joked
10. CREWS, supra note 8, at 1-15. (The quotation from McLaughlin is at 5; the one
from Wilson, at 12.)
II. /d. at 7-10, 23-48. (The quotation about the New Deal is at 23.) In a brief foreword, Alpheus T. Mason, a Corwin student and colleague and his successor in the McCormick Chair of Jurisprudence at Princeton, adds two other gems: Corwin claimed never to
have spent more than eight weeks on anything he wrote; and, by Mason's reckoning, he put
in no more than a half-hour's preparation for an undergraduate lecture, going in with a few
scribbled notes. /d. at ix.
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with students about joining the Court," Crews reports, "and reporters and friends approached him with the idea incessantly."12
Then came the announcement of the Court-packing plan, in
February 1937. In particular, Corwin's appearance before the Senate Judiciary Committee, as the administration's lead-off "expert
witness," offered him an opportunity to solidify support for nomination to a seat when one fell vacant. But the hearing did not provide
the forum Corwin had expected-the role of witness did not allow
the intellectual repartee produced by Socratic exchange in the classroom. Then, too, his examiners noted his own late conversion to
the merits of enlarging the Court, which made him look opportunistic and marked him as a partisan. The Court plan failed, the appointment never came, and a degree of embitterment set in. In 1940
the professor proclaimed his support for Wendell Willkie on the
ground that the two-term limit was part of the American constitutional tradition; and with the introduction of the Lend-Lease Bill at
the beginning of 1941, Corwin described Roosevelt's power as assuming the shape of "truly royal prerogative."I3
The Court episode may lend credence to the adage sometimes
applied to academicians, that power corrupts and the absolute lack
of power corrupts absolutely. (Some may ask whether the observation also applies to Corwin's shift during the Wilson Presidency,
when he came out for Charles Evans Hughes in 1916 and later sided
with Henry Cabot Lodge in the fight over the League of Nations.)I4
But I wonder whether Corwin was as disappointed as Crews and
others suggest. He knew too much about Court appointments to
have harbored many illusions about his own chances, whatever the
speculations in the press. He possessed no political base; and not
only did he have no judicial experience-this master of the Constitution was not even a certified lawyer. Furthermore, his later intellectual and political shifts were not entirely unheralded by earlier
commitments. Certainly, too, new events-which raised new questions and challenged the adequacy of old answers-must compete
as factors explaining his altered outlook. Is
One product of Corwin's later years was The President, Office
and Powers. First appearing in 1940, it was revised in 1941 and,
12. /d. at 26.
13. See id. at 26-32; Garvey, Scholar in Politics: Edward Corwin and the 1937 Court·
Packing Battle, 31 PRINCETON U. LIBR. CHRON. I (1969).
14. See CREWS, supra note 8, at 12-15.
15. See CORWIN (5th ed.), supra note 8, at xvi-xvii (revisers' introduction). In particular, however much he supported a Presidency adequate to protect national security, Corwin
cringed at the long-run implications of the war-produced merging of executive and legislative
authority through the medium of delegatory legislation. See, e.g., id. at 297; CREWS, supra
note 8, at 37-39.
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after his formal retirement in 1946 at age 68, went through further
revisions in 1948 and 1957. The last of these editions consisted of
313 pages of text and 181 pages of notes, themselves a mine of extended citations, collateral commentary, and relevant documents.
The organization was topical, the seven chapters covering "Conceptions of the Office," "The Apparatus of the Presidency," "Administrative Chief," "Chief Executive," "Organ of Foreign Relations,"
"Commander-in-Chief in Wartime," and "Legislative Leader and
'Institution.'" The prose was vintage Corwin-pithy and sometimes biting (following Mencken, FDR became "Roosevelt 11")and the substance of the book combined the insights of political
philosophy with aptly chosen historical evidence. Nor did it neglect
traditional legal sources; although court decisions per se by no
means dominated the account, in Corwin's hands they sprang to
life. Overall, The President was informed by a sense that the Presidency was a fit unit for study-it made a difference (for good and
ill), and it had a dynamic character which defied formulaic approaches. A reader cannot help but be impressed by the mature
learning it incorporates; surely Corwin's breadth of scholarship, especially in his early years, played a role here.t6
In the 1957 edition, Corwin offered this summary assessment
of the factors producing the Presidency of the mid-1950's:
(I) social acceptance of the idea that government should be active and reformist,
rather than simply protective of the established order of things; (2) the breakdown
of the principle of dual federalism in the field of Congress's legislative powers;
(3) the breakdown of the principle of Separation of Powers as defining the relation
of President and Congress in lawmaking; (4) the breakdown of the corollary principle that the legislature may not delegate its powers; and (5) the impact on the President's power as Commander-in-Chief . . . of two world wars and the vastly
enlarged role of the United States in the international field.17

Yet, despite his concerns about the heritage of Roosevelt II and the
growing impact of presidential personality on the power of the office, he remained bullish about American democracy.ts What is
perhaps equally intriguing is the insight this passage provides about
Corwin's conception of constitutional scholarship, for he prefaced
his listing-and note again its first item-with the remarkable com16. Not only does Crews's bibliography disclose Corwin's versatility within the constitutional area; it reveals that in 1907, for example, he edited a general history of Scandinavia,
and in 1916 published French Policy and the American Alliance of 1778, an expanded version
of his 1905 Ph.D. dissertation in American history at the University of Pennsylvania. See
CREWS, supra note 8, items A3 & Bl.l.
17. E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957, at 311-12 (4th rev.
ed. 1957).
18. See id. at 312. He seemed less hopeful, however, about the impact of the Presidency
on personal rights.
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ment that it explained the office "so far as it is explicable in terms of
American constitutional law and theory."19
This classic has now been reissued in a fifth edition, but, as the
three revisers admit, the revision is limited in scope. Although
repaginated, the text and notes of the 1957 edition remain unchanged. A new eight-page introduction assesses Corwin's life and
work, and postscripts of three to nine pages apiece (including updated bibliographies) have been appended to each chapter.
The result is adequate but hardly dazzling. Not that the decision to leave the core of the 1957 edition untouched was wrong, for
the revisers are surely correct in remarking that "only Corwin could
revise Corwin."2o Nor, by my reckoning, do the postcripts omit
many, if any, of the most significant developments in the Presidency
since the late fifties. Instead, the letdown comes because, juxtaposed against the original text, the new material seems awfully thin.
For example, Corwin conveyed a good deal about the impact of
presidential personality-especially that of Roosevelt li-on the
constitutional growth of the office, but the new additions give the
reader little comparable feel for Lyndon Johnson or Richard Nixon,
each of whom possessed fascinating personal traits that unquestionably influenced the modem constitutional order. To be sure, one
postscript surveys the recent analytical literature on presidential
character and style,21 but this is hardly a substitute for ongoing attention to the interaction between personality and institutional
change. Similarly, the court cases that enter into the updates appear as titles and summaries of holdings-not as the contests involving real people and events that Corwin skillfully wove into The
President-and other major documents receive similarly fiat
treatment.
I also have several narrower complaints. The Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, the reader is told at one point, "was enacted
. . . by the use of concurrent resolution . . . "-a clear mistake
which is compounded by the howler that Corwin, because he approved the use of concurrent resolutions as legislative vetoes,
"would have urged" this constitutionally unknown method of enacting a law.22 Just over a page later, in a discussion of the War
19.

/d. at 311. In the 5th edition, the comments discussed in this paragraph are at 358·

59.
20. CoRWIN (5th ed.), supra note 8, at xi.
21. See id. at 32-34.
22. Jd. at 194-95 (emphasis added). For the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, see
Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799 (1970). The postscript also incorrectly cites the act as 83
Stat. 377, which is the same incorrect citation that is included in the secondary source that
the postscript cites in its short discussion of the act. See CoRWIN (5th ed.), supra note 8, at
194 & nn.3-4. For a brief history of the Act and subsequent amendments, see L. FISHER,
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Powers Resolution, one discovers that "[affter ninety days, Congress may pass a concurrent resolution calling on the president to
withdraw American troops. "23 Only two postscripts later does an
accurate summary of the measure appear, including the now-invalidated provision for congressional veto of a military action within
sixty days.24 And at least in the review copy I received, page 154 is
missing, replaced by a reprint of page 153. Readers will have to
tum to page 132 of the 1957 edition to find the omitted text. But to
conclude on a more positive note, the new bibliographies are useful-even if Nelson Polsby becomes Nelson Polsky in one entry2s_
and the revisers' introduction is informative.
Louis Fisher has provided a truer successor to Corwin's The
President. A revision of his The Constitution Between Friends,
Fisher's Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress and the President
is an integrated whole, and the new title, if less catchy, is more accurate. (The earlier heading came from an alleged incident involving Grover Cleveland and a Tammany chieftain; when the
President explained a veto as the result of his constitutional objections, the politician queried, "What's the Constitution between
friends?"26) Fisher, on the contrary, takes the Constitution with
refreshing seriousness.
To be sure, he devotes little space to discussing how to interpret the document, and readers will find no agonizing over "interpretivism," "noninterpretivism," and the like. He instead sets the
stage by quoting Lord Bolingbroke's analysis of the English Constitution as "an assemblage of laws, institutions and customs. "27 This
leads him immediately into a thoughtful portrayal of the American
"constitutional setting," which, he argues, allows for several modes
of interpretation and growth. Indeed, it is only constitutional
change through blind legislative acquiescence in executive initiatives that draws his ire.2s
The remainder of the book is a topically organized, thoroughly
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 114-15 nn.50-53
(1985) [hereinafter cited as FISHER].
23. CoRWIN (5th ed.), supra note 8, at 196 (emphasis added).
24. /d. at 299-301. As the revisers mention in passing, the WPR's provision for veto by
concurrent resolution was almost surely overturned by Immigration and Naturalization Serv.
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). For a useful review, see Glennon, The War Powers Resolution Ten Years Later: More Politics Than Law, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 571 (1984).
25. See CORWIN (5th ed.), supra note 8, at 36.
26. L. FISHER, THE CONSTITUTION BETWEEN FRIENDS: CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT,
AND THE LAW at v (1978), which also includes another version of the tale. I note that the
preface to the new edition omits the episode.
27. FISHER, supra note 22, at 3, (quoting from C. MciLWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM:
ANCIENT AND MODERN 3 (1947)).
28. See id. at 3-27.
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up-to-date discussion of most of the subjects covered in The President. Some further chapter highpoints: "Appointment Powers"
(chapter 2) includes attention to the little-studied intricacies of both
recess appointments and the separate category of temporary appointments. Fisher concludes that the "appointment power operates in a framework of studied ambiguity, its limits established for
the most part not by court decisions but by imaginative accommodations between the executive and legislative branches."29
Next, a detailed review of the removal power (chapter 3)
reveals that the "decision of 1789," as Corwin labeled it,3o did not
involve a neatly defined choice between three or four distinct positions on who could remove executive officers, as is so often stated,
and in the end it settled little-witness the disputes in our own century. In this connection, interestingly, Fisher gently chastises
Corwin, pointing out that when the Supreme Court handed down
Myers v. United States (1926),31 Corwin levied a telling attack on
Chief Justice William Howard Taft's use of logic and history, and
particularly his claim that the President could remove any executive
officer. Such rigid rules would not do. Yet Corwin himself was
distinctly uneasy at Justice George Sutherland's use of the term
"quasi," in Humphrey's Executor v. United States (1935),32 to describe the blending of judicial and legislative functions in the Federal Trade Commission. "[I]f a Federal Trade Commissioner is not
in the executive department, where is he?" Corwin asked. "In the
legislative department; or is he, forsooth, in the uncomfortable halfway situation of Mahomet's coffin, suspended 'twixt Heaven and
Earth?" And when it came to the controversy over loyalty removals in the 1950's, Corwin relied on none other than Myers to support
the President's "overriding power" to fire suspected employees,
without regard to due process.33 Further disputes under Carter and
Reagan involving Inspectors General and Civil Rights Commissioners are only some of the most recent episodes; and the record fairly
well establishes that Congress has ample resources both to protect
the tenure of officeholders (as in the case of "whistleblower" Ernest
Fitzgerald) and to force removal (as with Veterans Administration
head Robert P. Nimmo in 1982).34
29. !d. at 59.
30. CoRWIN (5th ed.), supra note 8, at 101-02.
31. 272 u.s. 52.
32. 295 U.S. 602, 628-29.
33. For Corwin's views that are discussed in this section of FISHER, supra note 22, see
Corwin, Tenure of Office and the Removal Power Under the Constitution, 27 CoLUM. L. REV.
353 (1927); CORWIN (5th ed.). supra note 8, at 104-108, 431 n.109.
34. See FISHER, supra note 22. at 60-98.
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In the area of legislative power, Fisher pairs problems of delegation (chapter 4) with the range of veto options open to Congress
(chapter 5, which also reviews the intricacies of presidential vetoes).
He is not troubled by extensive legislative delegations and, aside
from the efforts of the Old Court in the 1930's, finds that the judicial response has been largely captured in Robert Cushman's
syllogism:
Major Premise: Legislative power cannot be constitutionally delegated by
Congress; (2) Minor Premise: It is essential that certain powers be delegated to
administrative officers and regulatory commissions; (3) Conclusion: Therefore the
powers thus delegated are not legislative powers.35

(I)

The real question, Fisher stresses, is how to control delegated authority, a task now made more difficult by Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha (1983).36 Not surprisingly, he adds his
voice to those criticizing the decision as "play[ing] fast and free
with history" and at odds with the true interests of both political
branches. "No one should underestimate the ingenuity of Congress
to think up devices that will be more cumbersome for the President
than the legislative veto," he cautions. Possibilities include requirements for specific approval of spending deferrals or reorganization
plans through joint resolutions, grants of authority more limited in
time (thereby forcing the executive branch to seek frequent renewals), and creative use of appropriations procedures to get informal
commitments from agency heads.37 (More about this in a moment.)
When it comes to "power over knowledge" (chapter 6),
Fisher's book reveals tensions between constitutionally rooted interests. Most likely, these tensions cannot be resolved. Congressional
investigatory power and protection of Congressmen and their aides
under the speech or debate clause are essential to the legislative process, yet each may threaten citizens' rights, and at its core each has
proved immune from judicial check-a reality Fisher notes but
downplays. On the other side, courts have recognized executive
privilege, which at its core (particularly in matters involving foreign
affairs) seems immune from legislative or judicial inquiry. But
Fisher's overall assessment points ultimately to congressional
supremacy if matters ever are pushed to extremes, for there remains
the impeachment process, the "most solemn form" of the congressional investigative power; and here, against a determined Congress,
there would be no check. Fisher keeps this prospect in the background, however, as a kind of tacit prod to acceptance of the pat35.

36.
37.

/d. at 100-101 (footnote omitted).
462 U.S. 919.
FISHER, supra note 22, at 178-83. (The quotations are at 179 & 181-82).
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tern of accommodation which he again argues has been, and should
continue to be, the dominant pattern in the constitutional order.Js
In theory, "the power of the purse" (chapter 7) is a little like
the impeachment power in theory. Aside from a handful of restrictions on areas or objects for which money can be spent (or not be
spent), appropriations are entirely discretionary with Congresseven for so-called entitlement programs-and could be a weapon of
enormous significance in interbranch conflicts. But the appropriations power in practice has become a loose cannon, or worse, despite a rich history of budgetary reforms (and Fisher carefully
chronicles these efforts). Congress, largely for ill, has checked executive control over large areas of the budget, but the need for legislative majorities to approve annual figures has in turn largely
eliminated effective spending controls within Congress. Meanwhile,
Presidents have found their way around a variety of clear legislative
budgetary mandates, and now Chadha has opened more loopholes
for the President. Indeed, Fisher's stance itself indicates the seriousness of the problem, for he pretty much throws up his hands.
The reality, and one fundamental enough to have constitutional significance, is that "[r]ecent budgetary practices have brought transformation without progress, expertise without mastery, and
information without understanding."39
Through no fault of his own, Fisher's treatments of "treaties
and executive agreements" (chapter 8) and "the war power" (chapter 9) are perhaps the least revealing, but only because the subjects
are common staples in most discussions of the constitutional dimensions of executive-legislative conflict. He manages nonetheless to
offer relatively fresh glimpses, noting, for example, the recent practice of including Senators and Representatives on diplomatic negotiating teams; the nugatory status of the Logan Act in light of such
activities as citizen Nixon's 1976 trip to China, Ramsey Clark's
1980 visit to Iran, and Jesse Jackson's travels in the Middle East
and Latin America; and the probable desuetude of the War Powers
Resolution's less well-known relative, the National Emergencies
Act of 1976. Among areas that will likely see further development,
he includes the de facto roles of the House in approval of treaties, of
the Senate in the termination of treaties, and of both Houses together in controlling executive agreements. His evaluation and
analysis of the War Powers Resolution is fair-minded, concluding
38. See id. at 184-220.
39. See id. at 221-51. (The quotation is at 251.) Earlier, in his discussion of the veto
power, Fisher discounts the worth of a presidential item veto to solve the problem. See id. at
159-62.
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that whatever problems Chadha has created for the control mechanism established by the WPR, the real difficulty is congressional
wavering in the face of presidential reluctance to comply forthrightly with the Resolution's provisions.40
Specialists, I suspect, will find little that is new in those sections of Constitutional Conflicts that focus on their own areas of
expertise, and in some instances one may quibble over details or
question broader interpretations.4I On balance, Fisher's sympathies
obviously lie with Congress, so that, for instance, when he urges
interbranch accommodation in order to solve conflicts over access
to knowledge, he also cautions that although it may be proper for
the judiciary to bow to executive claims of privilege based on national security and cognate considerations, the legislature should
hesitate before showing similar deference. 42 But one reason for this
slant may be that Fisher, like Corwin before him, perceives executive aggrandizement as the current wave, despite the blip of reaction
that Watergate produced. Certainly his verdict of relative congressional impotence regarding enforcement of the War Powers Resolution evidences little optimism. And even his sanguine assessment of
Congress's post-Chadha options is less convincing in light of his acknowledgment that our national legislature seems simply unable to
get its budgetary house in order.
On the whole, Constitutional Conflicts is a successful attempt
to probe America's "constitutional enterprise," to borrow a term
from Professor Harris, who nicely captures what I take to be
Fisher's unstated premise when he writes, "The [Constitution's]
words narrate the polity into existence and, as its working principles
unfold, the polity becomes a kind of large-scale text in its own
right."43 Without doubt, anyway, Fisher sees the constitutional enterprise as a "complex of relations between text and polity, word
and structure," to draw again on Harris's formulation.44 For this
reason, Edward Corwin would welcome Constitutional Conflicts.

40. See id. at 284-325.
41. Were I feeling more quibblish, I would do more than mention that one of his citations does not really support the referenced text; compare id. at 109, text associated with n.
30, with Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. I (1973).
42. See FISHER, supra note 22, at 218-20.
43. Harris, Bonding Word and Polity: The Logic of American Constitutionalism, 76
AM. PoL. SCI. REV. 34 (1982).
44. /d. at 44. For the sake of clarity, however, it needs noting that Fisher avoids the
kind of theoretical analysis which Harris undertakes.

